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In this paper, I construct a simple model that illustrates conditions under
which increased criminal sanctions can lead to increased levels of crime.
This nding is derived from the interaction of binding budgetary con-
straints and plea bargaining, given that the costs of trial are assumed
to be increasing in the size of sanction. In an environment with these
institutional features, maximal sanctions are not optimal when resources
are limited, and increased sanctions cannot generally be viewed as a sub-
stitute for increased monitoring. In this framework, increasing sanctions
for dierent oences proportionally can lead criminals to substitute be-
tween oences. In fact, increased sanctions can lead to more severe crime.
This eect is unambiguous when the marginal cost of trial is constant or
increasing. The increasing cost of trial can imply that even when a pro-
portional sanction increase implies a reduction in total crime levels it may
imply an increase in severe oences, since some minor criminals will sub-
stitute into more severe crimes. This model also suggests that increased
resources for prosecutors deter crime.
1Special thanks to Dan Bernhardt and Patrick Francois for encouragement and supervision. Chris
Ferrall, Steeve Mongrain, John Spicer, and Dan Usher provided helpful comments. I am grateful to
the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for nancial support. All errors are
my own.1 Introduction
Increasing penalties has long been believed to be a crucial strategy for decreasing
the incentives to commit crime, and thereby, reducing the level of crime. In Becker's
(1968) model of crime, he identied two variables that could be adjusted to increase
deterrence by aecting the certainty and the severity of punishment: the probability
of apprehension and the length of sentences.
Empirical evidence appears to indicate that the level of crime is more responsive
to changes in the probability of apprehension than to changes in severity.2 Although
empirical issues make these results dicult to judge, the ndings do suggest an asym-
metry in the eects of increased certainty of apprehension and increased severity of
punishments on the crime level.3 Anecdotally, this asymmetry has also been observed
in some jurisdictions. For example, in New York City increasing the probability of
apprehension by increasing the police presence appears to have drastically reduced
crime4 where threats of increased punishments had appeared unsuccessful. A similar
asymmetry can be generated by an institutional feature: Prosecutors with restricted
resources may make plea bargains with defendants.
In the present U.S. judicial system, few criminal cases are determined by trial.
In fact, approximately 90% of cases are resolved by guilty pleas.5 Given the severe
budgetary pressure on prosecutors, this mechanism of resolving cases is viewed as
an essential tool for managing large case loads. However, the implications of plea
bargaining for the other objectives of the judicial system are not often considered.
Within a model which incorporates a constrained prosecutor, increased sanctions
may lead to reduced deterrence. When sanctions are increased, the costs of trial
increase, and this places additional pressure on the prosecutor's resource constraint.
2Ehrlich (1996) discusses the ndings of the empirical literature on deterrence. He also discusses
many issues in this empirical work including identication issues, mismeasurement of data, and
diculties in separating incapacitation and deterrence eects.
3See for example Ehrlich (1975, 1977), and Wolpin (1978).
4Although causality is dicult to ascertain, an increased police presence has been conjectured to
have been an important factor in crime reductions.
5This gure is from United States Sentencing Commission Data. Resolved cases are dened as
those dealt with by guilty plea, dismissal or trial.
1As a consequence, prosecutors nd themselves required to make more frequent and
more generous plea bargains, which may result in a decreased expected sentence for
any given potential criminal.
In a model with oences of varying severity, the prosecution cost associated with
avoiding trial is larger for more severe oences. As a result, increasing the probability
of getting a plea bargain, when a plea bargain divides the surplus generated by avoid-
ing trial, makes more severe crimes relatively more attractive than less severe crimes.
Given the cost of trial function is not very concave in the sanction level, this can lead
to a substitution from less severe crime into more severe crime. This eect is driven
solely by the fact that more severe crimes are more costly to try. In this model, I
illustrate that in an environment with plea bargaining, increased sanctions may lead
to a reduction in deterrence and/or to a substitution into more severe oences.
Becker (1968) argued that given the substitutability of certainty and severity of
punishment in deterring crime, the most ecient way to reduce crime levels, if cap-
turing criminals is costly, is to set maximal sanctions and small probabilities of appre-
hension. This paper suggests that in the presence of resource{constrained prosecutors
who enter into plea bargains the use of maximal sanctions may not be optimal.
There is a long literature attempting to explain the non{optimality of maximal
sanctions. Stigler (1970) and Mookherjee and Png (1994) argue that maximal sanc-
tions reduce marginal deterrence, and thus, encourage criminals to commit more
severe crimes or crime more intensely. Costly sanctions (Polinsky and Shavell (1979),
Shavell (1987), Kaplow (1990)), errors in apprehension (Ehrlich (1975)), or imper-
fect information about the probability of apprehension (Bebchuk and Kaplow (1992))
can imply non{optimality. Maximal sanctions can imply overdeterrence of socially
desirable activities (Mookherjee and Png (1992) and Shavell (1991)). Malik (1990)
argues that criminals increase expenditure on socially wasteful avoidance activities
as sentences rise. Andreoni (1991) shows that the probability of conviction may fall
as sentences rise if jurors use a reasonable doubt test. Boadway et al. (1993) demon-
strate that time{inconsistency can imply that maximal sanctions, if threatened, may
not be imposed after the crime is committed.
2In this paper, I abstract from all of these issues. I construct a simple model, in
which prosecutors have no commitment problems, defendants' guilt is observable,
and the probability of conviction is constant across sanction levels. Within this
environment, I demonstrate conditions under which increasing sanctions can lead to
more crime. This result relies on two assumptions. First, the prosecutor is resource
constrained. By entering into plea bargains, the prosecutor can resolve cases in a less
costly manner than going to trial. Secondly, the cost of going to trial is increasing
in the size of the sanction. As the sanction increases, defendants exert more eort
in their defense;6 and therefore, their cases require more prosecutorial eort. In
Andreoni's (1991) argument, increasing the sanction increases the standard of proof
required by the jury, and this, therefore, may require more prosecutorial eort.
In this environment, I illustrate that as long as sanctions cannot be raised to
the point where no one commits a crime (avoiding the limiting case), in the pres-
ence of plea bargaining under budgetary constraints, raising sanctions can lead to an
increase in crime levels. I also show that increasing sanctions can lead to a substi-
tution between oences. In fact, even a proportional increase in sanctions can imply
substitution. The eect of this is that, even if increased sanctions reduce the total
number of crimes being committed, it can actually imply a higher incidence of severe
crime. Instead of increasing the legislated sanction, a better strategy for reducing
crime may be to increase the expenditure on prosecutorial services. Increasing this
expenditure would reduce the pressure to oer attractive plea bargains for admin-
istrative reasons.7 Another method of increasing deterrence may be to increase the
probability of apprehension.
In the next section of the paper, I discuss the basic model with one oence. In
that environment, I consider the eect of increasing the legislated sanction and the
probability of apprehension. I, then, generalize the model to one with two oences,
6Defensive eort is shown to be increasing in the penalty in Rubinfeld and Sappington (1987)
and in the model presented in the previous paper in this thesis.
7This paper does not address many other reasons that plea bargains are given. For example,
bargains are often given as a means of acquiring information about other criminals, or as an avenue
through which prosecutors can act as advocates for defendants.
3and consider the incentive of agents to substitute between these oences. Lastly, I
discuss policy implications and conclude.
2 Model with One Oence
There is a measure of agents who are indexed by their criminal aptitude , which is
uniformly distributed on the unit interval. More able agents are assumed to extract
more rents from criminal activities. There is one possible criminal activity which
has a payo of (), where 0() > 0. I assume () is a concave and dierentiable
function. If agents do not commit a crime, they receive a reservation utility which is
normalized to zero.
If an agent commits a crime, she will be caught with probability  > 0.8 For
simplicity, I assume that no innocent agents are charged.9 The prosecutor is assumed
to not observe ; and therefore, no sentences or plea bargains are conditioned on
the agent's ability.10 The expected sanction from going to trial is sT, which is the
product of the probability of conviction pc and the legislated sanction s.1112 With
some probability   2 [0;1], the defendant will be oered a plea bargain. The resulting
sentence sP is the outcome of an arbitrary bargaining game between the defendant
and the prosecutor.
8This assumption can be generalized to (), where the probability of apprehension is a function
of the aggregate crime level. However, this does not qualitatively aect the results.
9Beyond simplifying this exposition, this assumption serves to reduce the incentive of agents to
commit crimes. If there were a positive probability that an agent would be charged and convicted
of a crime he did not commit, then the incentive for that agent to commit a crime would increase.
10Or equivalently, the prosecutor is directly assumed to not be able to condition plea bargains on
agent ability.
11Andreoni's intuition (1991) can be translated into this problem as follows. If we assume that
pc is decreasing in s, then as s rises, sT does not necessarily rise, and in fact, could fall. Therefore,
increasing the legislated sanction s could reduce the agent's expected penalty from trial. As a
result, in the bargaining game, the defendant's position could be improved. However, throughout
this paper, I assume that the probability of conviction is xed; and therefore, the legislator can
directly aect sT by altering the legislated sanction s. If the probability of conviction is a function
of prosecutorial eort, then the increasing cost of trial can be viewed as a consequence of increased
eort required to oset either a direct eect of the increased sanction on the probability of conviction
or an indirect eect operating on the probability through the defendant's increased trial eort. These
eort dynamics are explicitly considered in the previous paper in this thesis.
12Since in this model all arrested agents are guilty, it is simplest to suppose sT = s directly.
4Agents are risk neutral. Their expected payo to crime can be written
()   [ sP + (1    )sT]:
Denote as , the agent who is indierent between committing a crime and receiving
his reservation utility. This agent is implicitly dened by
(
) = [ sP + (1    )sT]: (1)
All agents    choose to commit a crime, and all agents  <  do not.
Therefore, 1  represents the total quantity of criminals. I assume that (1) > 2sT
guaranteeing that some agents always commit crimes (i.e.   1). I also assume
that (0) = 0 < sP, which implies that the least able agent will never commit a
crime.
The prosecutor aims to maximize average expected sentences.13 In previous work,
prosecutors have been modeled as maximizing total expected sentences14 or social
welfare.15 However, if a prosecutor maximizes total sentences, he may have an in-
centive to encourage more crime, and thus, to have more criminals to prosecute. A
prosecutor maximizing average expected sentences can be thought of as having one of
two motives. First, the prosecutor may be maximizing deterrence, and therefore, act-
ing in the social interest. Second, the prosecutor may be self{interested and associate
professional status and electoral success with being `tough on crime'. The prosecu-
tor is constrained by a resource constraint, which can be interpreted as the nancial
resources of the prosecutor's oce, or the time of the prosecutor. The prosecutor's
problem can be written as
max   sP + (1    )sT
subject to M  (1   
)(1    )c(sT) ; 0     1
13Note that with this objective the prosecutor has no time{consistency problem. This is due to
the fact that the prosecutor values imposing high sanctions. However, the legislator may wish to
alter the punishments once the crime has been committed as in Boadway et al. (1993), in order to
avoid imposing socially{costly punishments. If this game is repeated, this problem can be avoided.
For that reason, I assume that the legislated sanction is not altered after crimes are committed.
14For example, the prosecutor maximizes total expected sentences in Landes (1974).
15As in Grossman and Katz (1983) and Reinganum (1988).
5where (1   ) represents the number of captured criminals, M is the total budget,
and c(sT) is the cost of a trial.16 For expositional ease, the cost of a plea bargain
is zero. As the sanction associated with trial increases, the cost of prosecuting the
case increases (i.e. c0(sT)  0). This increased cost can be thought of as an increased
eort cost resulting from either an increased standard of proof,17 or increased defensive
eort.18 Either of these factors would induce prosecutors to exert more eort in a
case going to trial in response to an increase in the sanction level.19 Prosecutors
are assumed to be `small'. So, in deciding to plea bargain, they do not internalize
the consequences of the aggregate level of plea bargaining on individual plea bargain
outcomes.
3 Plea Bargaining
A plea bargain is the outcome of a bargaining game between a criminal defendant and
a prosecutor. Entering into a plea bargain results in the defendant pleading guilty and
receiving an agreed upon sentence which I denote sP(sT).20 A plea bargain divides
the surplus generated by foregoing a trial. In particular, the defendant gains from
having his sentence reduced by the quantity sT   sP. The prosecutor loses the same
16This could also be modelled with the total cost being a function of the total number of trials
without qualitatively aecting the results. Although this seems a natural way to capture congestion,
it signicantly complicates the analysis. If the cost function is very convex, then as the number of
cases taken to trial rises the plea bargaining outcome becomes more lenient (since the marginal cost
of taking an additional case to trial is rising). This, in turn, can imply that given a xed level
of crime taking a larger proportion of cases to trial actually reduces an agent's expected sanction.
Although this can be parameterized such that it yields the following results, I focus on a simpler
construction that does not have this convex congestion cost.
17An increased standard reduces the probability of conviction giving an incentive for more prose-
cutorial eort.
18In particular, if prosecutors and defendants each chose trial eort levels, then increasing the
sanction would always induce more eort by defendants. If this enhanced the marginal productivity
of prosecutorial eort (ie. if
d
2pc
depded > 0), prosecutors would always choose to increase their eort
levels in response.
19These eort decisions can be modeled more explicitly; however, they considerably complicate
the analysis without qualitatively changing the ndings. For a more explicit treatment of these
issues issues, see Roberts (1999).
20Often plea bargains do not dictate the exact sentence, only a charge and a sentence range. In
that case, sP can be interpreted as the expected sentence over this range. Since all agents are
risk{neutral, this is an equivalent interpretation.
6quantity in total sentences. However, he saves the cost of a criminal trial, c(sT).
I assume that sP is the outcome that is reached in this bargaining game. Although
I do not model this game explicitly, it is helpful to consider the sign of
dsP
dsT . In
particular, what is the eect of changing the legislated sanction on the outcome of
the bargaining game? An increase in sT can be interpreted as an increase in the
bargaining power of the prosecutor, or rather as a decrease in the threat point of
the defendant. As a result, the sign will generally be positive. However, the entire
magnitude of the increase in sT may not be translated into an increase in sP. When sT
increases, the cost of taking a case to trial also increases, and as a result, the benet
of obtaining a plea bargain for the prosecutor rises. This eect works to improve the
relative position of the defendant in bargaining.
For example, consider the Nash Bargaining Solution to this game where the parties
evenly divide the surplus in equilibrium. The resulting plea bargain is given by21













As can be seen directly in this example, not only the magnitude of the change in the
plea bargain outcome, but also its sign, is determined by the eect of the increased
sanction on the cost of trying a case.22 Throughout this paper, I focus on situations
in which increasing the trial sanction increases the plea sanction. Therefore, I assume
dsP
dsT 2 [0;1].
4 Behaviour of Prosecutors
The prosecutor's objective function is decreasing in the proportion of people oered
plea bargains,  , and increasing in the plea settlement, sP. So, in equilibrium, he
21The simplicity of this expression follows from the linearity of agents' objectives.
22Recalling Andreoni's intuition (1991) that increasing the legislated sanction can reduce the
probability of conviction then the expected trial penalty sT would not necessarily rise, and in fact,
could fall. Given this implied improvement in the bargaining position of the defendant it is immediate
to see that dsP
ds could be negative.
7will minimize  . The prosecutor minimizes the number of plea bargains in order to
increase the expected sentence of each captured criminal. Suppose that his budget
constraint always binds implying that M < (1 )c(sT), for any  < 1. Therefore,
  cannot be set to zero, and is determined by the budget constraint. The equilibrium
proportion of cases taken to trial becomes




Substitution into (1) implicitly denes the critical agent ,
(




4.1 Consequences of Increasing the Legislated Sanction
Suppose the legislative body wants to increase deterrence of the crime modeled above
by increasing the trial sanction. Abstracting from any eect of an increased sanction
on the probability of conviction (as addressed by Andreoni (1991)), the expected
sanction resulting from trial sT increases. In the following proposition, I consider the
impact of such an increase on the level of crime 1   . When d
dsT < 0, an increase
in the trial sanction sT encourages more agents to commit crimes and leads to an
increase in the overall level of crime 1   .
Proposition 1 The eect of an increase in the legislated sanction, sT, on the crime























Although increasing the trial sanction weakens the position of the prosecutor
by increasing the cost of taking a case to trial, this eect may be partially oset
by the increased sanction improving the bargaining position of the prosecutor. In
the following corollary, I highlight two cases. First, the bargaining position of the
prosecutor improves dramatically from the increase in trial sanction. As a result,
the plea bargain outcome is increased by the entire amount of the increase in the
8trial sanction. Second, the plea bargain outcome is unaected by the increase in
trial sanction. In this case, the bargaining benet of an increased trial sanction can
be thought of as being entirely oset by the increased cost of going to trial which
decreases the bargaining power of the prosecutor. If the sign of d
dsT is negative in
the rst case, implying the crime level has increased, then it will also be negative in
the second case. If crime is increased when the bargaining power of the prosecutor


























In the large bargaining power eect case (where
dsP
dsT = 1), when M
c(1 ) is large
relative to , there are few plea bargains (this follows from the budget constraint).
Therefore, any increase in the cost of trial has a large eect because of the large
number of cases being tried. The larger this eect the higher the probability of the
increase in sanction leading to an increase in the crime level.
The probability that increasing the sanction will increase the crime level is in-
creasing in the distance between the trial and plea bargain outcomes, increasing in
the marginal eect of the increased sanction on the cost of trial, and decreasing in the
cost of trial. The expression
sT sP
c is a measure of the sacrice made by a prosecutor
in agreeing to a plea. The larger sT   sP is the larger the sentence reduction received.
The larger c is the larger the benet from avoiding trial. When this sacrice term is
large, the eect of an increased sanction is more likely to lead to an increased level
of crime.
94.2 Consequences of Increasing the Probability of Apprehen-
sion
Increasing the probability of apprehending criminals is often considered a substitute
for increasing sanctions. However, in the context of this model, they can produce dras-
tically dierent results. Assuming that prosecutors cannot enter into plea bargains to
acquire information, prosecutors cannot aect the probability of capture. Given this
and if the probability of apprehension has no impact on the plea bargain outcome,
prosecutors' budgetary considerations have no impact on this probability. As a re-
sult, increased monitoring does not interact with these constraints in the same way
that increased sanctions do. Consequently, the intuition that increased monitoring
increases deterrence is maintained.
Proposition 2 Increasing , the probability that a criminal is caught, reduces the
level of crime.
However, the increased number of apprehensions may have an impact on the plea
bargaining outcome. In particular, increasing apprehensions may result in congestion
which forces prosecutors to oer more appealing plea bargains. Therefore,
dsP
d < 0:
If this is the case, then
Proposition 3 If increasing the probability of apprehension results in more gener-
















This expression is positive implying increased deterrence unless the bargaining
eect is very large. In fact, d
d > 0 if
dsP
d > 0. So, the crime level will be reduced by
increasing the probability of apprehension only if the bargaining eect is large enough
to entirely oset the direct eect of the increased probability of conviction.
This suggests that given the institutional features that are observed in the current
judicial system; increased sanctions and increased monitoring may not be thought of
10as close substitutes. This observation can perhaps partially explain the success of
increased police monitoring in New York City and the relative failure of increased
sentences.23
4.3 Consequences of Increasing Prosecutorial Resources
Increasing prosecutorial resources, can deter crime by slackening the constraints on
prosecutors. As a result, prosecutors enter into fewer plea bargains. This implies
a higher expected sentence for potential criminals. If
dsP
dM > 0, there is also a bar-
gaining eect. Given the prosecutor has to oer fewer pleas for budgetary reasons,
his bargaining power or threat point is increased in any bargain he does undertake.
Therefore, he can oer less attractive pleas.
Proposition 4 Given
dsP
dM  0. Increasing the prosecutorial resources M, reduces
the level of crime.
Although increasing both sanctions and monitoring may have important eects on
the level of crime, this proposition also suggests an alternative strategy for reducing
the level of crime: increase the resources and bargaining power of prosecutors.
4.4 Discussion of Optimal Policy
If the social planner chooses a value of M suciently large that the prosecutor's
budget does not bind, then the prosecutor would take every case to trial, and the
model would collapse to the basic Becker framework. The planner could then achieve
the desired level of deterrence by adjusting the probability of apprehension and the
sanction. If the sanction is costless to impose, the optimality of maximal sanctions
re{emerges. Since maximal sanctions will deter if every case goes to trial, the budget
required is falling in the sanction. However, given the current judicial system, where
less than 10% of cases go to trial, the budget necessary to take every case to trial
seems infeasible.
23In particular, the increased narcotics sentences implied by the mandatory minimum provisions
have not appeared to reduce narcotics oences.
11Alternatively, one could reduce the cost of trial directly. For example, by reducing
the burden of proof. However, this possibility has other obvious disadvantages in a
system where guilt is to be ascertained.
If increasing the prosecutorial budget is too costly relative to altering the proba-
bility of apprehension, then the government would leave the prosecutor constrained
and focus deterrence eorts on making punishment more certain. In this constrained
environment, maximizing sanctions may not be optimal.
5 Model with Two Oences
Increasing sanctions may cause more severe crimes. This is even the case if the total
crime level falls. Since dierent crimes imply dierent plea bargaining concessions,
the eect of increasing sanctions is not uniform across the plea bargaining outcomes
associated with dierent oences. The implications of this are most easily illustrated
in a simple model with two crimes,  2 fH;Lg, where H denotes the more severe
crime. The sanctions for these oences are denoted sH and sL, where sH  sL. The
cost associated with taking a case to trial is c(s), where c0(s) > 0. Therefore, it is
more costly to try more severe oences.
I denote the payo to crime as , where H > L. Each agent chooses either to
commit crime H or L or to not commit any crime. For simplicity, I assume that the
probability of capture, , is constant across crimes.24 Assume an interior solution so
that agents 1  2 commit the more severe crime, and agents 2  1 commit the less
severe crime. In equilibrium, the prosecutor chooses the probability of plea bargaining
with each type of case,  H and  L, subject to a budget constraint given by
M = (1   2)(1    H)c(sH) + (2   1)(1    L)c(sL);
where M is the total prosecutorial budget. Throughout this section of the paper, I
assume that plea bargains are determined by Nash bargaining for simplicity. As a
24This assumption does not qualitatively aect the results. However, if the probabilities of appre-
hension are very dierent, it is unlikely that both crimes will be committed in equilibrium.
12result, the plea bargain outcome is sp
 = s   1
2c(s). The ex ante expected sentence
is given by Es = (1    )s +  sp
 = s   1
2 c(s).
The prosecutor maximizes the average expected sentence as before. I assume that
the prosecutor does not internalize the eect of his policy on the aggregate crime
level. Therefore, the prosecutor's problem is given by
max L; H
(2   1)EsL + (1   2)EsH
(1   1)
subject to M = (1   2)(1    H)c(sH) + (2   1)(1    L)c(sL):
The associated rst order conditions imply that
 H =  L:
5.1 Proportionally Raising Sanctions
If the penalties for both oences are increased proportionally, the crime level for either
oence may fall or rise. These implications are easily seen as a simple generalization of
the results from the previous one oence case. However, adding a second oence adds
some new insights. In particular, with more than one crime, agents can substitute
not only in and out of crime but also between dierent oences. In fact, increasing
sanctions proportionally can reduce the total amount of crime, but still increase its
average severity. Some agents committing the less severe crime may choose to not
commit an oence and others may choose to substitute into the more severe oence.
This is driven by the fact that the plea bargaining process may serve to make the less
severe oence less attractive relative to the other two options.
The binding budget constraint implies that when sentences are increased more plea
bargains will be oered unless the eect of the increased sentences is to drastically
reduce the level of crime in which case the number of plea bargains will fall.
Lemma 1 Proportionally increasing sanctions always leads to an increase in the
probability of receiving a plea bargain,  , if the following conditions hold:







13Lc(sH)(c(sH)   c(sL))  H(c(sH)
2   c(sL)
2)
This condition is sucient to guarantee that the cost eect is not outweighed by




The eect of a proportional increase in sanctions on the total level of crime (ie.
on the 1 margin, where 1   1 represents the total crime level) is ambiguous as in
the above case with only one oence. However, the eect on the level of severe crime,
1   2, is clearer.




(c(sL)   c(sH)) +  (c
0(sL)   c
0(sH))] < 0:
The sign of this expression is primarily determined by the curvature of the cost
function. If the cost function is very concave, then the rate of increase of plea bar-
gaining surplus may be suciently slower for the more severe oence to discourage
substitution. In fact, with a suciently concave function, an increase could encourage
substitution into the less severe oence. However, if the cost function is weakly con-
vex then as the sanction rises the surplus associated with the severe oence relative
to the less severe oence also rises encouraging substitution.
Corollary 2 Given that a sentence increase has led to more plea bargains, propor-
tionally increasing sanctions leads to more severe crime if the trial cost function is
weakly convex.
As long as the cost function is not too concave, increasing sanctions will lead to
an increase in crime severity as agents substitute from the less severe crime into the
more severe crime. This result is again driven by the increasing cost of punishment.
The foregone cost of trial is greater for the more severe oence. This surplus is then
divided, making the more severe crime more appealing to potential criminals. In this
manner, the increased sanction results in a more appealing plea bargain for the severe
crime. This eectively reduces the expected sanction associated with that oence and
entices more agents to undertake that oence.
145.2 Policy Implications
Stigler (1970) argued that marginal deterrence, deterring people from more severe
crimes, was one argument against the universal use of maximal sanctions. In a similar
vein, Mookherjee and Png (1994) show that marginal deterrence is also important on
the intensity of crime margin. However, in both cases, the implied optimal schedule
of sanctions, sanctions which increase in oence severity or intensity, should then
be shifted upward maintaining the marginal relationship between sanction levels for
dierent oences. This simple model shows that proportional increases in sanctions
cannot guarantee that these marginal relationships are maintained. Rather, the above
result suggests that when increasing sanctions, the appropriate marginal relationships
to consider are those between the expected penalties as opposed to the legislated
sanctions for dierent oences.
6 Conclusion
Given the observation that some agents receive plea bargains,25 this model suggests
that increasing sanctions may lead to increased incentives to commit crime. This
reduction in deterrence is driven by increasing trial costs and binding budgets.
A more eective method of deterring crime may be to increase the budgets and
number of prosecutors or to even decrease the legislated criminal sanctions. Another
eective way to increase deterrence may be to increase the probability that criminals
are apprehended.
Mandatory minimum sentences, which are currently used for many drug and vio-
lent crimes, may serve as a method of increasing criminal sanctions without increasing
25Although it is dicult to discern how many plea bargains are made solely for the purpose of
conserving resources, the large proportion of cases resolved in this manner suggest that this is an
important factor. This model lacks important features of the judicial process which also motivate the
use of plea bargains. Most importantly, I do not incorporate risk aversion which is a primary reason
why prosecutors and defendants reach agreements. In this model, I also do not consider the problems
of asymmetric information about agents' guilt or innocence. If some agents are innocent, they might
want to go to trial in order to separate themselves from guilty defendants as in Grossman and Katz
(1983). Prosecutors and defendants could also possess dierent information about the strength of
the prosecutor's case, as discussed in Reinganum (1988).
15the costs of trial. In these cases, the cost of trial may not be increasing in the sanction
since the quantity of evidence that must be prepared and presented is limited to only
a few dimensions (i.e. the quantity of drugs possessed).
\Three strikes" laws, like those in California, where a third felony conviction
results in life{imprisonment may reduce the benets of plea bargaining to career
criminals. Even if the defendant is risk{neutral, and the expected sentence from plea
bargaining is less than that of going to trial, the defendant may not wish to plead
guilty to a felony, and may rather risk being sentenced to a much more severe sanction
in the hope of being found innocent. The benet to being found innocent is now much
higher than in a system where punishment increases more slowly following previous
guilty decisions.
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Concavity of  implies that the above term is greater than




Recalling that (1) = [ sP + (1    )sT], and that (1) > 2sT, implies (4) is












is equal to the sign of the right hand sign of (3).







= sP > 0
The result follows from the concavity of () and the binding budget.




































dM  0, d
dM > 0 given the concavity of () and the binding budget.
19Proof of Lemma 1: Substituting equilibrium crime levels into the prosecutor's




(1   2)c(sH) + (2   1)c(sL)+
1
2[Lc(sH)(c(sH)   c(sL))   H(c(sH)2   c(sL)2)]
L(H   L)

= (1    )

(1   2)c
0(sH) + (2   1)c
0(sL)+
[(H   L)(1
2 c0(sH)c(sH) + c(sL)   c(sH)) + 1











the numerator is positive.
That the denominator is also positive is guaranteed by
Lc(sH)(c(sH)   c(sL))  H(c(sH)
2   c(sL)
2):
Proof of Proposition 5: The agent indierent between the two crimes is given by
2 = [
sH   sL + 1
2 (c(sL)   c(sH))
H   L
]:










(c(sL)   c(sH)) +  (c
0(sL)   c
0(sH))]:
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